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Abstract
The three chapters of this dissertation study topics on Public Economics.
In the ﬁrst chapter I analyze the feasibility of Universal Basic Income based on
the Mirrlees model. In Chapter 2, together with my co-author, we study the
role that demographics played in the great recession. Finally, in Chapter 3, I
analyze the ﬁnancing of public universities in Paraguay.
In Chapter 1, I analyze the convenience of a cash transfer program, or uni-
versal basic income (UBI), combined with a ﬂat or linear marginal tax rate
on income. Proponents of a policy of cash transfers argue that if combined
with a simpliﬁcation of welfare programs and the tax system, it could generate
enough beneﬁts through a reduction of administrative costs and a reduction of
distortions, especially in the labor market. This idea is not new in economics,
and numerical results in models as in Mirrlees (1971) have lump-sum compo-
nents that can be interpreted as UBI. Also, Mirrlees has noted that the optimal
marginal non-linear tax rate is close to a linear tax system. I start by double-
checking Mirrlees' calculations and determining that those numbers hold for a
wide range of parameters. For a utilitarian planner, if a simpliﬁcation of the
tax system results in a value of 0.18% - 0.5% of GDP, a linear tax system is de-
sirable. Second, I analyze the eﬀects of introducing uncertainty in the optimal
non-linear tax system. I introduce uncertainty in the preference of the agent. I
show that heterogeneity could be a factor in making the optimal non-linear tax
system closer to a linear tax system. In the extreme case where heterogeneity
increases to its maximum possible value, the optimal tax system tends toward
a linear tax system.
In Chapter 2, jointly with Fausto Patiño Peña, we study the role of demo-
graphics in the Great Recession. Since the Great Recession, output and labor
diverted from their pre-crisis long term trends. We show that demographics is
iii
able to explain a signiﬁcant portion of the gap between the long-term trend and
the data, for both output and labor. An important reason why demographics
play an important role during the crisis's recovery period is that the Great Re-
cession coincides with the baby boomers entering the age cohorts associated
with lower levels of labor force participation. Accounting for these demographic
changes, we document that labor is converging to a diﬀerent employment trend.
Furthermore, we modify the standard growth model and calibrate it to capture
the demographic features of the data for the period 1990 - 2015. Our results
show that by 2015 the output and labor gap have been reduced by just 2.5%
and 1.2% respectively.
In Chapter 3, I study the eﬀects of tuition-free public universities in Paraguay.
The funding of tuition-free public universities is highly regressive in Paraguay.
Most of the students come from families that belong to the top of the income
distribution. In this paper, I analyze the current free tuition system and study
the eﬀects of an alternative ﬁnancing method. In the alternative system, the
student does not pay anything while he is in school and returns the cost of his
education in the future if he earns more than a certain amount. I estimate that
this change in funding would reduce the cost for the government of ﬁnancing
tertiary education by 75 percent, an amount that would be covered by graduates
who achieve high incomes in the future.
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1 Tax Simplicity and Universal Basic Income
1
2
1.1 Introduction
Is giving cash directly to people a radical idea? Although this idea is not new1,
he growing interest in universal basic income recently2 has created a debate that
should be informed by economic theory. Among other arguments for UBI3, I focus on
the argument that UBI generates beneﬁts by simplifying the tax system and welfare
programs. This argument states that a lump-sum transfer combined with a constant
marginal tax rate on income 4 is preferable to a tax system that includes several tax
rate brackets and welfare programs for those at the bottom of the distribution. .
To answer the question above, I'll use the model developed by Mirrlees (1971).
In this model the tax system is generally described as a lump-sum transfer to the
individual (as a UBI), and a non-linear tax rate on income. In that paper, Mirrlees
concludes that an approximately linear income-tax schedule, with all the administra-
tive advantages it would bring, is desirable. Other papers like Farhi and Werning
(2013) and Heathcote, Tsujiyama (2015) ﬁnd that a linear tax is close the optimal
non-linear one. The ﬁrst thing I do in this paper is to try to replicate the ﬁndings
of these studies for several diﬀerent parameters, making sure that the results are not
speciﬁc to those authors' unique calibrations. I ﬁnd that the closeness is robust for
several parameters for a utilitarian planner.
Next, I show that adding heterogeneity to the preferences can also generate a
ﬂatter non-linear marginal tax rate. I follow Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015), where
1Friedman (1962) proposed something similar to UBI, a Negative Income Tax.
2Universal Basic Income can be deﬁned as a program or policy that transfers income (normally
in the form of cash) to all citizens or residents of a country or economy, regardless of their income
or wealth.
3More notably in the last years: automation. But others include the possibility of reducing
poverty and inequality, changing the welfare system that creates distortions in the labor market,
simplifying the tax system, etc.
4The tax system is an aﬃne system T (y) = b + τy, where b is the lump-sum component that
can be positive (a lump-sum tax) or negative (a lump-sum transfer). For simplicity, I'll call this tax
system a linear tax system.
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they use a quasi-linear utility function, as in Diamond (1998), to simplify the Mirrlees
model that allows for a simple characterization of the solution. With this model, I
show that as the agents become more heterogeneous, the marginal tax rate becomes
ﬂatter.
Adding heterogeneity to the preferences make the problem harder to solve, since
this adds more dimensions to the problem. As Judd, Ma, Saunders and Su (2006)
argue, the multidimensional case doesn't have a principle like single-crossing that
allows us to use the ﬁrst order approach. Also, numerical solutions become much
harder to calculate since constraints are not concave. Therefore simpliﬁcations are
necessary to characterize the solution.
Related literature. The literature related to the Mirrlees model is long and
a good summary can be found in Mankiw, Weinzeirl, Yagan (2009). Among the
papers that try to answer a similar question than this paper there is Alari (2016),
that compares universal transfers versus means tested in a partial equilibrium model,
and ﬁnds that means tested are preferred. Saez (2002) shows that a negative income
tax is optimal when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive mar-
gin. The paper by Damon, Marinescu (2017) analyzes the eﬀects of the transfers
of the Alaska Permanent Fund on the labor market. They do not ﬁnd a negative
eﬀect on employment, and they do ﬁnd an increase in part-time work. Marinescu
(2018) analyzes the behavioral eﬀects of cash transfer experiments realized in the past
on labor, education, consumption, health and others. In general these experiments
showed positive outcomes on the variables analyzed.
This paper is divided as follows. First, I solve numerically the standard Mirrlees
model for diﬀerent parameters and check if the linear system is close to the optimal
non-linear marginal tax rate. Second, I describe the model with heterogeneity in
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preferences and show that heterogeneity can generate a ﬂatter non-linear tax rate
(closer to a constant marginal tax rate). Then I conclude.
1.2 Tax simplicity
In this section I'll conﬁrm the conclusion found in Mirrlees (1971), that a linear
tax system is close to the optimal non-linear tax system. The model is a standard
Mirrlees model, which is described here brieﬂy.
There is a continuum of individuals, each having the same preference: u (c, l)=U(c)−
V (l) deﬁned over consumption x and labor l. Workers diﬀer only in their productiv-
ity w, with density f (w) . A planner cannot observe productivity w, but can observe
income y = wl. The agent maximizes its utility function u (c, l) subject to the budget
constraint:
c = y − T (y)
where T (y) is the tax paid.
Government maximizes a social welfare function
W =
∫ ∞
0
G(u)f(w)dw
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints, and a resource constraint:
∫ ∞
0
c(w)f(w)dw ≤
∫ ∞
0
y(w)f(w)dw − E
where E is the government expenditure (excluding transfers).
The parameters used are:
5Table 1: Parameters of the model
Variable Values Source
Utility functions
Type 1: u = log
(
c− l1+k1+k
)
Type 2: log(c)− log
(
1 + l
1+k
1+k
) Saez (2001)
Comp. elasticity(1/k) {0.25, 0.5} Saez (2001)
G (excluding transfers) {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} U.S. (2007) was 20.3%
People with ability = 0 5% Social Security
Distribution F (w)
Log-normal up to 42$ per hour.
Pareto (2) after that
CPS 2007, and
Saez (2001)
Social welfare function G (u) = u,
To analyze the eﬀects of moving from the full non-linear system to the linear
system, I'll use two measures:
1. Welfare loss (%W), whereW (u(c(1−w%), l);T,E) = W (u(c˜, l˜);˜T ,E). That is,
moving to a linear system is equivalent to losing %W of consumption for every
agent.
2. Saving needed (%S), where W (u(c, l);T,E) = W (u(c˜, l˜);˜T ,E(1−%S)).
The ﬁrst is the standard measure of welfare loss from not doing the optimal policy.
The second is the one that is more suitable for the goal of this exercise. The second
measure ﬁnds the savings in the economy (through simpliﬁcation of the tax system,
and welfare programs) that are necessary to make the planner indiﬀerent between the
non-linear and the linear tax systems.
6Table 2: Welfare loss and saving needed
Government spending (%GDP) 0.1 0.2 0.3
Compensated Elasticity
0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50
Type1 Utility
Welfare loss 0.31% 0.37% 0.29% 0.43% 0.25% 0.42%
Saving needed (% GDP) 0.27% 0.33% 0.23% 0.34% 0.18% 0.34%
Type 2 Utility
Welfare loss 0.50% 0.82% 0.50% 0.85% 0.51% 0.85%
Saving needed (% GDP) 0.38% 0.56% 0.49% 0.49% 0.52% 0.52%
Table 1 shows how close the two measures are for the linear tax compared to the
non-linear one. In terms of welfare, using a linear tax system implies a reduction
of equal to or less than 0.85% on average consumption. It should be noted that
this comparison is with the optimal non-linear tax system, and not with the actual
tax system. In Heathcote, Tsujiyama (2015)for example, they ﬁnd that the linear
tax system improves welfare compare to the actual system, and it achieves 71% of
the welfare possible given by the non-linear system. So, these numbers should be
interpreted as the distance in welfare between the linear system compared with the
best the government can do, and not with the actual system of an economy.
The savings needed to make the planner indiﬀerent is 0.52% of GDP or less,
depending on the parameters. These numbers can be compared directly with ad-
ministrative costs of welfare programs and tax systems. Also, there are other costs
related to having a non-linear tax system.Many tax systems change their tax rates
in a non-continuous fashion, and welfare programs depending on income of the par-
ticipant can change drastically by an increase of a small amount of income. These
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facts create kinks and notches5 in the choice set creating some behavioral responses
by individuals. For example, East (2018) ﬁnds a decrease in labor supply by welfare
recipients. Saez (2010) ﬁnds some accumulation of individuals (bunching) in kinks
created by the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), but he argues that ﬁscal evasion
can explain that bunching. More recently, with a richer database, Mortenson and
Whitten (2016) ﬁnd evidence of bunching in more kinks and this bunching is becom-
ing more important over time. Also, Ruh and Staubli (2018) ﬁnd strong evidence
of bunching in Austria due to a notch created by the disability insurance program of
that country.
In a recent document by the IDB6 they ﬁnd that 4.4% of GDP is lost because
of ineﬃcient public spending in Latin America, and 1.7% of that occurs in transfer
programs. That 1.7% is greater than all the values estimated previously.
1.3 The role of Heterogeneous preferences on Optimal Income
Taxation
In this section I'll show that heterogeneous preferences can be a suﬃcient condition
to have a linear marginal tax rate on income. This result is in line with the results
of Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015) and Judd, Ma, Saunders and Su (2006), where
they ﬁnd that heterogeneous preferences reduce redistribution.
Heterogeneous preferences present a challenge in solving the optimal problem, and
even numerical solutions are hard to obtain, as explained in Judd, Ma, Saunders and
Su (2006). The special case considered in Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015), with
5A kink is a non-smooth change in the choice set, as we see in changes in the marginal tax rates.
A notch is a discontinuous jump in the choice set, a feature that is normally generated by losses of
beneﬁts in welfare programs due to small increases in income. A review of kinks and notches can be
found in Slemrod (2019)
6See Izquierdo, Pessino, Vuletin (2018)
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simplifying assumptions, allows for a simple characterization of the solution. They
consider the Mirrlees model with a setup that is similar to Diamond (1998). By
using a speciﬁc form of heterogeneous preferences, they ﬁnd a solution that is similar
to that in Diamond (1998), but with a diﬀerent form of welfare weights. I'll use
this formulation and show that the non-linear optimal marginal tax rate on income
becomes ﬂatter as heterogeneity increases. The extreme case, where heterogeneity is
increased to its maximum possible amount, shows a linear marginal tax rate.
1.3.1 A model with homogeneous preferences
In this subsection and the following one I'll follow closely Lockwood and Weinzierl
(2015) to describe the model with homogeneous preferences and heterogeneous pref-
erences, and show how they compare to each other.
Individuals have a utility that is linear in consumption c and non-linear in labor
eﬀort l given by u (c, l) = c− l1+1/γwhere γ is the constant elasticity of labor supply.
They have an unobservable ability n ≥ 0 so that gross income y is equal to nl. Thus
we can rewrite the utility function in the following form:
U (c, y, n) = c− (y/n)1+1/γ (1)
The distribution of ability is given by the cumulative density function F (n)with
density f (n).
The planner selects the allocation {c (n) , y (n)}to maximize the social welfare
function W , solving:
W = max
{c(n),y(n)}
∫ ∞
0
g (n)U (c (n) , y (n) , n) f(n)dn (2)
9
where g(n) ≥ 0 is the welfare weight for type n assigned by the planner. If the
planner is utilitarian, g (n) = 1 for all n.
The maximization problem in 2 is subject to the resource constraint:
∫ ∞
0
(y (n)− c (n)) f (n) dn ≥ E
where E is government spending,
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints are:
U (c (n) , y (n) , n) ≥ U (c (m) , y (m) , n) , ∀ ,m, n
As done in the literature, we can deﬁne the income tax function as T (y) = y− c.
In this setup, as shown in Diamond (1998), the optimal tax function is charac-
terized by the following ﬁrst-order condition:
T ′ (y (n))
1− T ′ (y (n)) =
1 + 1/γ
nf (n)
(G (n)− F (n)) , ∀n (3)
where G (n) =
∫ n
0 g(m)f(m)dm∫∞
0 g(m)f(m)dm
, normalized so that G (0) = 0 and limn→∞G (n) = 1.
1.3.2 A model with heterogeneous preferences
A simple model that can add heterogeneity and keep the simplicity of the solution is
developed in Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015), which I describe shortly below.
The model is a modiﬁcation of the previous subsection, where now an individual
is deﬁned by a two-dimensional type (w, θ), where w ≥ 0 is now the unobservable
ability so y = wl, and θ > 0 is an unobservable preference parameter. This parameter
is assumed to have a population average equal to one, and can be thought of as a
taste parameter scaling the disutility of labor relatively to consumption. The utility
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function of the agent is now u (c, l) = c− (l/θ)1+1/γ . As in the previous section, the
utility can be rewritten as:
U (c, y, w, θ) = c−
( y
wθ
)1+1/γ
(4)
Here it is important to note that in (4) the two unknown parameters to the planner,
w and θ, are entered in the utility function speciﬁcally to help solve the problem. If
two individuals (w′, θ′),(w′′, θ′′) are such that w′θ′ = w′′θ′′, they will behave as if they
are the same individual.
Thus, the product wθ is a suﬃcient statistic for this problem and the planner can
consider individuals as a function of the product wθ. The planner then will choose
allocations {c (wθ) , y (wθ)} .
As in the previous section, it is assumed that the planner seeks to maximize the
welfare functionW using welfare weights b (w, θ), depending now on both parameters.
Let H (w, θ) denote the joint probability distribution of ability and preferences, with
density h (w, θ). The planner's problem is:
W = max
{c(wθ),y(wθ)}
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
b (w, θ)U (c (wθ) , y (wθ) , w, θ)h (w, θ) dwdθ (5)
The resource constraint in this case is:
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
(y (wθ)− c (wθ))h (w, θ) dwdθ ≥ E
and the IC constraints.
I'll use the same assumption used in Lockwood and Weinzierl (2015).
Assumption: b (w, θ) = b (w, θ′) for all θ and θ′, or b (w) ≡ b (w, θ) for all θ.
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Under this assumption, (5)becomes:
W = max
{c(wθ),y(wθ)}
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
b (w)U (c (wθ) , y (wθ) , w, θ)h (w, θ) dwdθ (6)
Now, to transform this model to an equivalent version of the homogeneous pref-
erences, it is useful to make a change in variables denoting the uniﬁed type by n, so
that n = wθ.
The change of variables implies some changes in notation. Let Hˆ (θ, n) now be the
joint distribution of preferences and uniﬁed type, with density hˆ (θ, n) = h (n/θ, n) .
Also, let f (n) =
∫∞
0
hˆ (θ, n) dθ. Then substituting the variables, the resource con-
straint and the IC constraint in both models are the same.
Further, the planner problem can be written as:
W = max
{c(n),y(n)}
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
b (n/θ)U (c (n) , y (n) , n) hˆ (θ, n) dθdn =
max
{c(n),y(n)}
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
0
b (n/θ) hˆ (θ, n) dθ
f (n)
)
U (c (n) , y (n) , n) f (n) dn
or
max
{c(n),y(n)}
∫ ∞
0
bˆ (n)U (c (n) , y (n) , n) f (n) dn (7)
where bˆ (n) =
(∫∞
0
b(n/θ)hˆ(θ,n)dθ
f(n)
)
.
Note that (7)is equivalent to (2), with bˆ (n) instead of g (n) .
Now, the optimal income tax will be given by equation (3), with
G (n) =
∫ n
0
bˆ (m) f (m) dm∫∞
0
bˆ (m) f (m) dm
(8)
So, the introduction of heterogeneity on preferences in this model creates another
12
model that is equivalent to the original one, but with a modiﬁed welfare weight that
will depend on the distribution of the preference parameter.
1.3.3 The role of heterogeneity on marginal income tax rates
I now proceed to show an analytical and a numerical result, showing the role of hetero-
geneity on the marginal income tax rate. The result applies for Pareto distributions,
an important distribution for this literature since it is use to estimate the tail of the
ability distribution as in Saez (2001).
I'll consider the simpliﬁed version of the model where the ability distribution is
independent of the preference parameter. Assume the ability is distributed Pareto
with parameter α, that is, w has support [w0,+∞] and the pdf is αw
α
0
wα+1
. The preference
parameterθis distributed uniformly between [θL, θH ] . Speciﬁcally, I'll consider the case
where θL = 1−  and θH = 1 +  for  < 1.
Let:
b (w) = κw−η (9)
be the welfare weight assigned by the planner to the individual with ability w, for
positive values of κand η.
In the following proposition I state the main result, that the marginal tax rate
goes to a constant for all n above some level of wages w.
Proposition: Consider the income tax function (3) that solves the planner prob-
lem in (7), where G (n) is given by (8). Further, let the welfare weight be given by (9)
and the uniﬁed type distribution be given by the joint distribution of w and θ, where
w is distributed Pareto and θ ∼ U [1− , 1 + ] is uniformly distributed.
Then, as → 1, T ′ → C for all n ≥ w0θH , where C is a constant.
13
Proof: see appendix.
To understand this result we must notice that, as  increases, every uniﬁed type n
includes more and more w types (in the sense that for every n type, several w types
are part of the uniﬁed n type). If  = 0, then n = w. But, if  > 0, for every n all the
w  [n/ (1 + ) , n/ (1− )]. Then, the welfare weight G (n) includes several wages w
and their corresponding values b (w) = κw−η. In fact, as  → 1, for every n ≥ w0θH
the uniﬁed type n includes all the w types from n/θH to ∞.
The economic intuition of this result rests on the fact that the parameter θ gen-
erates noise to the planner, where he is not able to distinguish what kind of w−type
the agent is. The more variation (the bigger ), the more noise there is. The only
exception to the constant marginal tax rate is for those types n  [w0θL, w0θH ] .Those
types are diﬀerent because there is only a subset of θ values that can be combined
with w to get n. For example, the uniﬁed type n = w0θL has a unique value for θ
that generates that value of n (which is θL). It can be seen in the ﬁgure below that
for n = 0.55 there is no w∗ that makes n = w ∗ θH .
The ﬁgures below show the w-types that every n-type implies for diﬀerent values
of θ. If  is small, fewer w-types are included in each n-type. If  is close to 1, more
w-types are included making the modiﬁed welfare weight bˆ (n) more alike for diﬀerent
n.
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Figure 1: Individuals of w type included in each n type for diﬀerent values of e
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The exercise is done for θ  [1− , 1 + ] and w  [0.5,∞]
To see how the marginal tax rate changes with . The next graph shows the
evolution of the marginal tax rate for diﬀerent values of .
Figure 2: Marginal tax rate for diﬀerent values of 
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Values used in this graph: w0 = 1, α = 2, κ = 1.5, γ = 1.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper I have calculated the closeness of a linear tax system to the optimal
non-linear tax system. I ﬁnd that a linear tax system is close to the optimal non-
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linear tax system for a wide range of parameters. As others have noted, the linear
system is better, in terms of welfare for the planner, than the actual tax system
in the US. So, this closeness seems to hold not only for some speciﬁcations of the
parameters model, but for a wide range of them. An obvious conclusion is that
countries where administrative costs are high, and distortions created by welfare
programs are important, have more to gain with a linear tax system.
Further, the characterization of the optimal non-linear tax system requires a lot
of information that might not be available to the planner. In the second part of the
paper I introduced heterogeneity into the preferences of the individuals, and I ﬁnd
that heterogeneity makes the non-linear tax system ﬂatter. A key result of this paper
is that heterogeneity could make the tax system completely linear.
Given these results, the answer to the question posed at the beginning is that
it is not radical to give cash directly to people. A lump-sum transfer, that can be
interpreted as UBI, is present on the Mirrlees model. Further, the non-linear tax
system is already close to the linear tax system. If we consider that individuals have
heterogeneous preferences, the non-linear tax system gets even closer to the linear
tax system.
This paper should not be interpreted as a proof of the convenience of a policy like
UBI; however, the paper does indicate that UBI should be considered seriously.
Further research should include dynamic aspects, as well as other uncertainties
that the planner may face, such as not knowing exactly the distribution of abilities.
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2 Demographics, Labor, and the Great Recession
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2.1 Introduction
Recent literature has reached the consensus that after the Great Recession, output
and labor in the United States diverted from their pre-crisis long term trends. Al-
though many theories are trying to explain the sources of these patterns, one plausible
candidate is demographics. The start of the crisis coincided with the baby boomers
entering age cohorts associated with lower levels of labor force participation and
retirement. Hence, this shift in the demographic composition has the potential of
explaining the observed economic activity during the recovery.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the eﬀects demographic changes had on
the evolution of output and labor in the recovery period after the Great Recession. For
this, we ﬁrst carry out an in depth analysis of employment trends for the time period
1990 - 2015. We document that a signiﬁcant portion of the literature is incorrect
when comparing the evolution of labor after the crisis with its pre-crisis trend. More
speciﬁcally, we construct a counterfactual trend in which we account for demographic
eﬀects on the intensive margin, number of hours worked, and the extensive margin,
labor force participation. We ﬁnd that our counter factual trend of employment, which
accounts for demographics, reduced the gap in between the pre-crisis employment
trend and the data by 83.7%.
Given this evidence of the potential eﬀects of demographics on labor supply, we
develop a growth model that incorporates demographics. More speciﬁcally, demo-
graphics aﬀect the dynamics of the model through the growth rate of population and
through changes in the age distribution of the population across time. We calibrate
this model to match moments of the US pre-crisis economy.
Using this model, we ﬁrst analyze how much demographics would have accounted
for changes on output and labor in absence of the Great Recession. We document
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that 35% of the output gap between the pre-crisis trend and the data is explained by
demographics. The channel through which demographics aﬀect output is through a
reduction in the hours worked by agents in the model. We then expand our analysis
to also include ﬂuctuations in total factor productivity. We ﬁnd that this speciﬁcation
is able to reduce the gap in between output in the model and output in the data to
2.5%. Furthermore the gap in between labor in the model and in the data reduces to
1.2%.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature related to demo-
graphics and the Great Recession. In Section 3, we carry out an in depth analysis
of trends in employment, taking into account the eﬀects that demographics has on
labor supply. In Section 4 we develop a framework that modiﬁes the standard Growth
model to include demographic changes. In Section 5, we use this model to explain
the patterns of macroeconomic variables that we perceive in the data. Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to two main branches of the literature: the Great Recession and
Demographics. Since 2008, many hypotheses have tried to understand the reasons
behind the slow recovery in aggregate output and employment for the United States.
UNA (2016) quantiﬁes the contribution of diﬀerent factors to explain their role in
the slow recovery of aggregate variables. He documents that through 2013, output
was 13 percentage points below its 1990 - 2007 trend, where the main contributors to
this gap were the fall in business capital, productivity, and labor force participation.
From a more theoretical standpoint, the causes and mechanisms behind the Great
Recession have been broad. For example, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015)
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set up standard neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition and coor-
dination failures to explain long recessions. They ﬁnd that a big transitory shock,
like the one in 2007, can force the economy into a steady state characterized by lower
output and employment. On the other hand, Shimer (2012) sets up a search model
with real wage rigidities to explain jobless recoveries. He documents that the interac-
tion of rigid wages with search frictions are important for a persistent slow recovery
in economic activity. Heathcote and Perri (2016), Mian and Suﬁ (2012), Mian, Rao
and Suﬁ (2013) and Midrigan and Philippon (2016) study mechanisms by which a
fall in housing prices, housing net worth, and tightening of credit standards caused
declines in household debt, consumption and employment. Our paper is similar to
these in the sense that it tries to understand the reduction in output and employment
that occurred after the crisis of 2007. It diﬀers from these as it tries to quantify the
role of demographics in explaining the fall in output and labor.
The discussion on demographics and its eﬀects on growth and employment has
been increasing in the past few years in the literature. First, Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), Chen, mrohoro§lu, mrohoro§lu (2016a) and DGEEC (2017), modify the
standard growth model to account for dynamics in exogenous variables such as the
growth in population. Among the caveats of only considering population growth in the
standard neoclassical growth model is that demographics only aﬀect the household by
increasing its size across time. In other words, population growth does not take into
account possible eﬀects of changes in the population distribution across age groups
as well as diﬀerences in agents' decision making at diﬀerent age groups.
Using an empirical approach, Maestas, Mullen and Powell (2016) ﬁnd that the
eﬀects of the population's age structure has an important impact on output per capita
growth for the US. They document that a 10% increase in the population above 60
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years causes a decrease in 5.5% in the growth rate of GDP per capita. Given these
aspects, we consider a modiﬁcation of the standard growth model, which accounts for
diﬀerences in the population composition of age groups across time.
Since the Great Recession, there has been a bigger discussion on the relation-
ship in between demographics and labor supply. In his quantitative approach, UNA
(2016) estimates that of the 13 percentage point drop in output, 1.1 was explained
by the eﬀect of the aging of baby-boomers on labor force participation. Maestas,
Mullen and Powell (2016) ﬁnd that of the 5.5% reduction in the output growth rate
caused by demographics, two-thirds is a result of slower growth in labor productivity
of workers across the age distribution, while the rest is a result of slower growth in
the labor force. To our knowledge, the closest work analyzing the eﬀects of demo-
graphics on labor supply is by Henriksen and Cooley (2016). They set up a life-cycle
model to examine how demographic induced changes in the intensive (hours worked)
and extensive (employment) margins of labor supply aﬀect the slowdown in output
growth. Our paper diﬀers to the aforementioned, as we analyze the speciﬁc eﬀects
that demographics have on macroeconomic aggregates through the lens of a modiﬁed
growth model.
2.3 Employment Trends
We use monthly micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) obtained
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, IPUMS. To understand the eﬀects
of demographics on labor supply and output after the great recession, we start our
analysis by documenting stable labor patterns before the crisis, for the period 1990 -
2007. We focus on this time period for the following reasons. We exclude the period
before 1990 because women employment rate was raising as a consequence of the
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increase of their participation in the labor force. Additionally, after 2007, the Great
Recession had a negative impact on labor.
Figure 3: Employment Ratio by Cohorts
Source: Current Population Survey
We analyze employment and hours worked by age cohort in between 1900 and
2007. For each cohort, we observe the number of workers, and the total amount of
hours worked. As Figure 1 shows, there is a stable evolution of the employment ratio
(Eat ), measured as the ratio of employment to population. For example, the monthly
employment ratio for workers with age 40 ﬂuctuated in between 78% and 83%; similar
patterns are found across age cohorts. We estimate the average hours worked by
those employed in each cohort (hat ), as the ratio of total hours to the total number
of employed in each age group. Figure 2, shows that this statistic is also stable over
time.
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To statistically test for the stability in the employment ratio and hours worked,
we ﬁt a line through the time series of these statistics (linear regression). We ﬁnd
that the slope of the linear regression is statistically zero for most years between 25
and 50 years old. The slope is statistically negative for younger cohorts, and positive
for older cohorts. However, in both cases the slope is relatively small7.
Figure 4: Average Hours Worked by
Source: Current Population Survey
Using these statistics of the employment ratio and average hours worked, we
construct a counterfactual of the total hours worked in the absence of the Great
Recession. The motivation for this is to have an aggregate labor measure that allows
us to compare the actual data to what would have happened without the crisis.
7The slope coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant for ages 15 to 20 (negative) and above 55 (positive).
On average the slope for younger cohorts implies a 2.7% decrease of employment ratio over 10 years,
and for older cohorts implies an increase of 3.4% over 10 years.
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We calculate the counterfactual in the following manner. Given the stability of the
employment ratio and average hours worked for every cohort, we calculate the average
of these measures across time as in equations (10) and (11):
E
a
=
1
T
2007:4∑
t=1990:2
Eat , (10)
h
a
=
1
T
2007:4∑
t=1990:2
hat . (11)
Figure 5: Average Employment Ratio by Cohorts
Source: Authors' calculation with data from CPS.
Figures 3 and 4 plot these statistics for every age group. The patterns portrayed in
Figures 3 and 4 are similar. For young cohorts, the employment ratio is lower as most
individuals in these cohorts are most likely with schooling responsibilities. For the case
of average hours worked, young individuals also work a smaller number of hours, a result
that is most likely due to their time being allocated to schooling. For age cohorts above
60, we can see that there is a fall in both employment ratio and average hours worked.
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As expected, older individuals begin to retire at around the age of 60, which causes the
employment ratio to fall. More speciﬁcally, in between the ages of 60 and 65 , the average
employment ratio falls in about 30 percentage points. Also, the average hours worked falls
for older individuals; in between the ages of 60 and 65, the average hours worked falls in
more than 5 hours. Hence, older cohorts would aﬀect aggregate labor supply through the
extensive margin, by choosing to not supply labor, and the intensive margin, by choosing to
work less hours.
Figure 6: Average Hours Worked by Cohorts
Source: Authors' calculation with data from CPS.
The product in between E¯a and h¯a yields the number of hours worked per person
in age cohort. Figure 5, shows this product. For older cohorts, there is a stronger
decline in the number of hours worker per person in contrast to the average hours
worked, as a consequence of labor supply falling through the extensive and intensive
margins. Comparing the age cohort of 60 to that of 65, there is a decrease in the
number of hours worked per person of more than 12 hours (58% drop).
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Figure 7: Number of Hours Worked per Person by Cohorts
Source: Authors' calculation with data from CPS.
Focusing our analysis on the drop of labor supply of older cohorts is important,
as it is a potential explanation of the apparent slow recovery of hours after the Great
Recession. The years of the crisis coincide with the start of the baby boomer gener-
ation entering older cohorts and leaving the labor force. As a result, demographics
played an important role during the years of the Great Recession, as they did in the
1980s and 1990s, when the baby boomers were at their most productive stage of their
lives.
Next, we construct the total hours worked for the time period analyzed above
1990 - 2007, as well as the time period afterwards, 2008 - 2015. For each year t, we
multiply the product in between E¯a and h¯a, times the population in its corresponding
cohort, (P at ). Then we sum across age cohorts:
Ht =
79∑
a=15
E
a ∗ ha ∗ P at .
This total hours worked after 2007 is our counterfactual measure of hours in absence
of the Great Recession. Assuming that the employment ratio and average hours
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worked had not changed, which is a reasonable assumption given the stability of Eat
and hat , Ht is the level of hours we would have expected in the economy given only
demographic changes, through P at . Figure 6 plots three pieces of data: the linear
trend of employment without taking into account demographics8 (gray line), our
employment counterfactual, Ht (blue line), and the actual data (orange line). It is
evident from Figure 6 that the linear trend of total hours and the data move parallel
to each other; in 2015 the gap in between these was -5.8% of the actual hours. On the
other hand, the data and our counterfactual measure of employment are converging
as the gap in between these is just -0.9% of the actual hours..
Figure 8: Total hours worked
Source: Authors' calculation with data from CPS and Census
8This is estimated as the ﬁtted line for the data in between 1990 and 2007, and then using this
ﬁtted line to forecast the years after 2008.
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We are conscious that the Great Recession constituted an important crisis, gen-
erating a big deviation of employment from its pre-crisis trend. However, it is also
important to note that demographics play an important role in explaining the rea-
son why employment did not recover to its trend before the crisis. The aging of the
working age population implies a fall in the total hours worked, which is captured
by our counterfactual employment trend. Comparing the data to this counterfactual
employment trend shows that demographics is important in explaining the slow re-
covery in labor. Furthermore, it provides evidence that ignoring demographic changes
from economic analysis can be detrimental not only for labor supply but for economic
activity as a whole.
2.4 Growth Model and Demographics
In this section, we describe a variation of the growth model, in which the representa-
tive household is comprised of individuals with diﬀerent ages. We will use this model
to generate our quantitative results, similar to the approach by Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) and DGEEC (2017). Below, aggregate variables are deﬁned by capitalized
letters, while per-capita variables are lower-cased.
2.4.1 Households
We assume there is a representative household with Nt members at time t. Population
grows at rate γNt = NtNt−1 . For each t, there is a number of P
a
t members of age a, so
that Nt =
∑S
a=s P
s
t , where s and S are the youngest and oldest ages in the household,
respectively. Also, the household owns capital and rents it to ﬁrms. Further, the
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household solves the following problem:
max
{{cat ,hat }Sa=s,Kt+1,Xt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
S∑
a=s
P at (log (c
a
t ) + α
a log (T − hat ))
s.t.
S∑
a=s
P at c
a
t +Xt ≤wt
S∑
a=s
P at h
a
t + rtKt − τt (rt − δ)Kt − pit for t = 0, 1, ...
Kt+1 =Xt + (1− δ)Kt for t = 0, 1, ...
given K0,
where aggregate consumption is Ct =
∑S
a=s P
a
t c
a
t and aggregate hours are Ht =∑S
a=s P
a
t h
a
t , T is the total time endowment per member, β is the discount factor, α
a
is the share of leisure in the utility function for individuals with age a, wt is the wage
rate, rt is the rental rate of capital, δ is the depreciation rate, τt is the tax rate con
capital income, pit is a lump-sum tax.
2.4.2 Firms
There is a representative ﬁrm, with the standard Cobb-Douglass Production Function,
Yt = AtK
θ
tH
1−θ
t , where Yt is aggregate output, At is total factor productivity, Kt is
the capital stock rented by the ﬁrm, and Ht is the labor input of the ﬁrm measured
in aggregate hours. We deﬁne θ as the share of capital in output. We assume that
At grows at rate γAt =
(
At
At−1
) 1
1−θ
.
2.4.3 Government
The government taxes household's income on capital and lump-sum tax pit, and uses
these resources to ﬁnance government spending Gt so that the government budget
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balances every period:
Gt = τt (rt − δ)Kt + pit.
2.4.4 Competitive Equilibrium
The resource constraint of the economy is given by:
Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt,
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Xt is aggregate investment and Gt is government
purchases.
Given a government policy {Gt, pit, τt}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium for this econ-
omy is an allocation
{
{cat , hat }Sa=s , Xt, Kt, Yt
}∞
t=0
and a sequence of prices {wt, rt}∞t=0,
such that:
1. given the government policy and prices, the allocation solves the household's
problem,
2. given the government policy and prices, the allocation maximizes ﬁrm's proﬁts
such that factor prices equal their marginal products, wt = (1− θ)At
(
Kt
Ht
)θ
and rt = θAt
(
Kt
Ht
)θ−1
.
3. the government budget is satisﬁed,
4. and the market clearing condition holds:
∑S
a=s P
a
t c
a
t +Kt+1− (1− δ)Kt +Gt =
AtK
θ
t
(∑S
a=s P
a
t h
a
t
)
1−θ.
2.4.5 Numerical Solution
We solve the model in a similar manner to Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and DGEEC
(2017). First, we compute the steady state of the U.S. economy in the suﬃcient
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distant future, using the calibrated parameters and exogenous variables. The steady
state is obtained from the equilibrium conditions of the model. With this steady
state, we apply a shooting algorithm toward this steady state from the given initial
conditions, corresponding to the ﬁrst trimester of 1990. The solution to this algorithm
is an equilibrium transition path from the initial conditions to the ﬁnal steady state.
The equilibrium conditions are characterized by the standard intratemporal con-
dition, Euler equation, and resource constraint obtained from the household's and
ﬁrm's optimality conditions:
αacat
T − hat
= (1− θ)At
(
Kt∑S
a=s P
a
t h
a
t
)θ
∀a, ∀t, (12)
cat+1
cat
= β
1 + (1− τt+1)
θAt+1( Kt+1∑S
a=s P
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
− δ
 ∀a, ∀t, (13)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + AtKθt
(
S∑
a=s
P at h
a
t
)
1−θ −
S∑
a=s
P at c
a
t −Gt ∀t. (14)
To obtain the steady state, ﬁrst we detrend all variables so that xˆt = xt
A
1
1−θ
for
per capita variables and xˆt = Xt
A
1
1−θNt
for aggregate variables. Equations (12) through
(14) become:
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αacˆat
T − hat
= (1− θ)
(
kˆt∑S
a=s η
a
t h
a
t
)θ
∀a, ∀t, (15)
cˆat+1
cˆat
=
β
γAt+1
1 + (1− τt+1)
θ( kˆt+1∑S
a=s η
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
− δ
 ∀a, ∀t,
(16)
γAt+1γNt+1kˆt+1 =kˆt
( kˆt+1∑S
a=s η
a
t+1h
a
t+1
)θ−1
(1− ψt) + (1− δ)
− S∑
a=s
ηat cˆ
a
t ∀t, (17)
where ψt is the ratio of government purchases to output, GtYt , and η
a
t is the ratio of
the population of individuals of age a at time t to the total population at time t, P
a
t
Nt
.
In steady state, detrended variables do not grow and the ratio of individuals of
any age a with respect to total population remains constant. Hence the steady state
equilibrium conditions are given by:
αacˆa
T − ha = (1− θ)
(
kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ
∀a, (18)
1 =
β
γA
1 + (1− τ)
θ( kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ−1
− δ
 , (19)
γAγN kˆ =kˆ
( kˆ∑S
a=s η
aha
)θ−1
(1− ψ) + (1− δ)
− S∑
a=s
ηacˆa. (20)
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2.5 Demographics and Macroeconomic Aggregates
2.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the growth model described above to determine the eﬀects of demo-
graphic changes on economic activity in the United States. The time period we use
for calibration corresponds to 1990 - 2007. The model has four parameters that are
the same for all the household: θ (capital share in production), δ (depreciation rate),
β (discount factor), and T (total discretionary hours in a week). Also, there is an age
speciﬁc parameter (αa). For our analysis, we shut down the government, so that its
revenue and expenditure is equal to zero. The values for the four common parameters
are shown in Table 1. These are calculated in the standard way, as detailed in the
Appendix.
Table 1: Parameters
θ 0.33
δ 0.058
β 0.948
T 100
The disutility of labor, αa, is an age speciﬁc parameter that is chosen such that
the average of hours worked in the model is the same as the hours worked in the data,
for each age. Using the intratemporal condition of our model, (12), we obtain:
αicˆi
T − hi =
αj cˆj
T − hj ∀ a = i, j.
The Euler condition, (13), implies that consumption level is the same for all ages. As
a result, the above equation simpliﬁes to:
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αi =
T − hi
T − hjα
j ∀ a = i, j.
Using our data counterparts, h
a
, calculated in equation (11), we calibrate αa for all
a. Figure 7 portrays the values of the disutility of labor by age. Our parameters vary
between 2.45 and 3.56. These are higher than what is documented in the literature.
The reason for this is that we consider hours per person by age as in ﬁgure 5, and
not the average hours worked (as in ﬁgure 4).
Figure 9: Disutility of work by age: αa
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As mentioned before, we are interested in quantifying the eﬀects of demographics
on output and labor. We will carry out two experiments. The ﬁrst only considers the
eﬀect of demographics on our model economy and sets up a counterfactual of how
macroeconomic aggregates would have evolved in absence of the Great Recession.
Demographics aﬀect economic activity through the population growth rate, γNt, and
through the ratio of the population of individuals of age a at time t to the total
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population at time, ηat . Both γNt and η
a
t are measured using data from the census.
Using the solution method described in Section 4.5, we use these time series and
a constant TFP growth rate γ¯A = 1T
∑2007
t=1990 γAt to obtain the equilibrium path for
macroeconomic aggregates9. We compare the evolution of the aggregates in our model
to those of the data to quantify the importance of demographics in explaining trends
in economic activity. Our second experiment builds on the ﬁrst one by considering
demographic eﬀects (γNt and ηat ) along with time-varying TFP growth rates, γAt
10.
2.5.2 Results
The period 1990 - 2015 is a time frame which constitutes a transition from a fast
growing population composed of middle-aged individuals to a slow growing population
with older individuals. Incorporating this feature into our model, we analyze the
transitional dynamics of several macroeconomic aggregates for the pre-crisis period
(1990 - 2007) and the years after the crisis (2008 - 2015). As mentioned in Section 5.1,
at ﬁrst we only consider these demographic eﬀects, and exclude any other exogenous
time varying variables, such as TFP. This allows us to understand how the economy
would have behaved in absence of the Great Recession.
The ﬁrst aggregate we evaluate is the capital to output ratio. There are two
eﬀects at work in the demographic transition of this economy. First, the decrease in
the population growth rate generates an increase in the consumption per capita over
time. Second, the aging of population reduces the amount of labor oﬀered to the
market, while keeping constant the number of people consuming. This second eﬀect
9For the ﬁrst experiment's ﬁnal steady state, we set the population growth to 0.4%, which is
consistent with the census's estimation of the growth rate for the period 2050 - 2060. Also, we set
the growth rate of TFP in steady state equal to the average growth rate between 1990 and 2007.
10For the second experiment's ﬁnal steady state, we set the population growth rate equal to 0.4%
and the TFP growth rate equal to the average TFP growth for the period 2008 - 2015.
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reduces the consumption per capita over time. These two eﬀects oﬀset each other, as
can be inferred from (16). As a consequence of this, our model predicts an almost
time invariant trend for the capital to output ratio as can be observed in Figure 8.
Figure 10: Capital/Output ratio with only Demographic Changes
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Figure 9 presents the evolution of output in the data since 1990 (green line). It
is clear that after the Great Recession, output deviated from its previous trend (red
line) and did not converge back to it11. A model which excludes the demographic
changes we account for in our model would yield an output trend similar to the linear
trend of Figure 912. By considering demographic changes, through changes in the
population growth rate and the population composition, our model is able explain at
least part of the deviation of GDP from its trend previous trend.
11The linear trend is calculated as the trend of the data from 1990 to 2007.
12We solve our model with constant population growth rate and time invariant population com-
position, and obtain a output series similar to that of the linear trend.
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Figure 11: GDP with only Demographic Changes
The model with only demographic changes is not able to account of all of the drop
in GDP, as the main contributor of the drop was the Great Recession, which is not
modeled in our ﬁrst experiment. Our exclusion of the negative TFP shock generated
by the Great Recession is necessary for us to quantify the only eﬀects of demographics
in explaining the deviation of the data from its pre-crisis linear trend. We document
that demographics accounts for 35% of the gap in between the pre-crisis linear trend
and the data.
The channel through which changes in the population growth rate and the popula-
tion composition aﬀects output is by the reduction of labor supply. As the population
ages, labor supply falls due to reduction in the hours supplied by the older cohorts.
Figure 10 is the model counter part of Figure 6. When we compare the model's total
hours to the counter factual employment trend of Figure 6, we can see that the fall of
the latter is more pronounced. In the model, demographics only aﬀects labor supply
through the intensive margin, i.e. the number of hours supplied by each cohort. The
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counterfactual employment trend also takes into account the eﬀects of demographics
on the extensive margin. That is, older cohorts participate less in the labor force.
Figure 12: Labor with only Demographic Changes
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Our second experiment builds on the previous one by incorporating TFP changes
also into the analysis. Hence, this model will also account for TFP movements for
the time period 1990 - 2015, where the most important was the negative TFP shock
of the Great Recession. Figure 11 shows the evolution of the capital to output ratio.
We can see that the model does a much better job of capturing the movements in
the data. Comparing Figure 11 to Figure 8, we conclude that demographic changes
which only aﬀect the economy through labor supply are not able to account for the
dynamics in the capital to output ratio. Also, the model predicts a higher level of
capital-output due to the decrease in the TFP growth rate13.
13The ﬁnal steady state was calculated using the average TFP growth rate of the period 2008 -
2015, which is smaller to the growth rate of the period 1990 - 2007.
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Figure 13: Capital-output ratio with Demographic and TFP Changes
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Figure 12 presents the evolution of GDP when we account for both demographic
and TPF changes in our model. We can see that the model explains most of the drop
in the GDP. Furthermore, by 2015 the gap between out model prediction and the
data is only 2.5%. Thus the interaction of TFP and demographic changes do fairly
well in capturing the evolution of output for the US economy.
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Figure 14: GDP with Demographic and TFP Changes
Demographic and aggregate productivity changes generate a model employment
counterpart that has similar movements to total employment hours seen in the data.
For example, by adding TFP changes to the analysis, employment in the model falls
in the year of the crisis, 2008. This feature was not captured in the previous exercise
by construction. By 2015, the gap in between the model and data employment series
was of about 1.2%. If our model was able to capture eﬀects through the extensive
margin, we suspect that this gap would be even smaller.
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Figure 15: Labor with Demographic and TFP Changes
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2.6 Conclusions
The eﬀects of demographics may not be big or fast, but they have the potential of
being important. The Great Recession coincides with a unique demographic period.
At the start of the crisis, the generation of baby boomers started to enter retire-
ment. Even though demographics is not what caused the Great Recession, it has
the potential of explaining certain patterns for the slow recovery after the recession.
For example, demographics play an important role in total hours worked and GDP
not returning to their pre-crisis trend levels. In this paper, we quantify the eﬀects
demographics had on explaining the evolution of output and labor.
We develop a modiﬁed version of the standard growth model. This model in-
corporates demographics into the neoclassical framework through population growth
rates and changes in population composition across time. We calibrate this model to
test the implications of these demographic changes. First, we abolish the eﬀects of
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the Great Recession on economic activity, so that we can evaluate how demographics
aﬀected output and labor for the time period 1990 - 2015. We ﬁnd that the model
explains 35% of the between output's pre-crisis trend and the data. We ﬁnd that
labor also drops but not substantially. This is a consequence of demographics only
aﬀecting labor through the intensive margin, amount of hours worked. If we consid-
ered a framework in which agents decided whether to participate in the labor force
or not, the we expect that hours would drop further in the model. When we account
for TFP changes for the time period analyzed, we ﬁnd that the model does a better
job of capturing movements in the data, for diﬀerent macroeconomic aggregates.
It is important to note that our model only considers the eﬀects of demographics
on labor supply, which limits the eﬀects of demographics on other variables. We are
not considering potential interesting eﬀects of savings decisions by diﬀerent cohorts
that can be important. Also, we are not considering eﬀects that demographics can
have on productivity, as suggested by Kuznets (1960). The ﬁrst, can be carried out in
a life cycle framework, while the second implies creating a theory of how productivity
can be aﬀected by aging and decreasing population growth rates. We consider both of
these important in order to quantify the eﬀects of demographics on economic activity.
Our future research agenda will build upon the work of this paper and will seek to
incorporate these two mechanisms into our analysis.
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3 Financing of Public Universities in Paraguay: A
solution to its regressivity
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3.1 Introduction
The ﬁnancing of university studies by the national state in Paraguay dates from 1889
when the National University of Asunción was created. In 2016 there were eight
national universities. The countries of Latin America, as well as much of the world,
ﬁnance tertiary education. In Paraguay, the State provided about 89% of the budget
of all national universities in 2016. Other income, such as fees paid by students,
covered the remaining 11%. There is an aspect of its ﬁnancing by the state that
aﬀects the redistribution of income. This state expenditure, which is a subsidy in
kind, go mostly to people who belong to high-income households. In 2016 only 6.2%
of the students belonged to the poorest 30% of the population, while 53% came from
the richest 30%. This expense increases income inequality in the country. In addition,
the investment required by these universities is increasing. Compared to 0.55% of the
GDP that they required in 2003, between 2012 and 2016 they required almost double,
an average of 1% of the GDP. I propose to solve this problem of regressivity with two
changes to the current system. First, eliminate all fees that, even if low, can be a
real impediment for students with limited resources. Second, create an additional
income tax for all those people who have studied at a national university and who
earn more than a certain amount to be established. In no case, throughout the life of
this person, the collection would exceed in real terms the cost of education. A similar
reform was done in England starting in 1998. Murphy, Scott-Clayton and Wyness
(2018) describe the eﬀects of this reform and they ﬁnd that charging tuition fees
increased quality, quantity, and equity in higher education.
The simulations show that with a tax that does not exceed 8% gross for those
with higher incomes, the recovery per student can reach 75%. This paper is divided
into four parts. The ﬁrst presents the data that show the regressivity of the ﬁnancing
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Figure 16: Students of undergraduate programs by economic decile
Source: Permanent Household Survey of Paraguay, 2016
of public universities. The second part talks about the costs of public universities.
The third proposes a change in the ﬁnancing system and simulates collection. The
fourth concludes the paper.
3.2 The regressivity of the funding of public universities
The Permanent Household Survey of Paraguay (EPH, Encuesta Permanente de Hog-
ares in Spanish) provides the economic level of those who attend public universities
(PUs). Students of PU undergraduate programs come mainly from households that
come from the highest deciles of the population, as shown in Figure 1.
In 2016, 53% of students came from households that are in the top three deciles,
while the lowest three deciles provided only 6.20% of students. The PUs also provide
postgraduate university programs. In these programs, the representation of house-
holds with greater resources is even greater, and the representation of lower income
households is even lower. Figure 2 shows the income distribution of students in post-
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Figure 17: Students of graduate programs by economic decile
Source: Permanent Household Survey of Paraguay, 2016
graduate programs.
From 2001 to 2016 there was not a single student from the three lowest deciles.
In these years, the three highest deciles contributed between 75% and 93.69% of the
students.
The fact that mostly high-income people attend PUs makes the state's spending
on PUs regressive.
The paper by Gimenez, Lugo, Colman, Galeano and Farfan (2017) calculates that
all state expenditures are progressive, except for spending on university education,
which is regressive, although the value is close to zero. This same document calculates
the concentration index for diﬀerent taxes and expenses of the state. The authors
ﬁnd that all taxes are absolutely progressive. Also, almost all expenses are absolutely
progressive, with the exception of subsidies for public transport and tertiary educa-
tion. Tertiary education is relatively progressive, that is, the concentration of tertiary
education spending goes mainly to the richest, but its concentration is not as unequal
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Figure 18: Years of study completed by economic decile, people 18 and 19 years old
Source: Permanent Household Survey of Paraguay, 2016
as that of income.
In the article by Sanguinetti, Berniell, Alvarez, Ortega, Arreaza and Penfold
(2012), the concentration index of tertiary education is calculated for other Latin
American countries. This document ﬁnds that, for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico,
and Peru, the index is positive (as in the Paraguayan case). That is, this spending goes
mostly to high-income people. Although the reasons why PU students are mostly high
income are several, the EPH very concretely shows that the economic situation is in
itself a very important factor. The poorest tend to abandon primary and secondary
education at much higher rates than the rich. Figure 3 shows how many years of
formal education were completed by 18- and 19-year-olds, where 12 years is expected
if they have ﬁnished high school.
To access the university, one should have completed secondary education. Only
10.6% of the poorest have done so, compared with 71.5% of the richest. These data
are very illustrative in pointing out that the usufruct of the PUs is concentrated in
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households with higher incomes. Finally, it should be noted that the National Uni-
versity of Asunción (UNA, Universidad Nacional de Asunción in Spanish) generates
some reports on the socioeconomic level of new entrants. These reports, contrary to
the above, report that students are mostly low income. In the appendix, I analyze
the causes of why this report classiﬁes students as low income when they are not
necessarily so. The quality of these reports is suspect, partly based on the fact that it
reports that in 2010 there were only three high-income students in the entire UNA of
the more than 25,000 of students. According to incoming reports from 2011 to 2016,
only ten more high-income students enrolled.
3.3 The costs of ﬁnancing public universities
In 2003, Paraguay was ﬁnancing four public universities: the National University of
Asunción, the National University of the East, the National University of Pilar, and
the National University of Itapúa. In 2007, the National University of Concepción
received its ﬁrst budget item, and in 2008, so did the National University of Villarrica
del Espíritu Santo. In 2009 the National University of Caaguazú was added to the
list and ﬁnally, in 2011, the National University of Canindeyú was included. By 2016,
there were eight universities funded at least in part by the state The budget of these
universities from 2011 to 2016 was 0.98% of GDP on average, approximately US$250
million for 2016. UNA receives 75% of this budget, and the remaining 25% is shared
among the other seven universities. Not all the funding of national universities falls
to the state. Students ﬁnance part of this expense through tuition, exam fees, and
other fees. There is also other income from the production of goods, services, and
donations. All of the income that comes from students is budgeted as "Source 30".
The portion of the budget ﬁnanced by Source 30 reached 21.99% in 2003, but it
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Figure 19: Public Universities' Budget as a percent of GDP
Source: Ministry of Finance, Paraguay.
decreased overtime and by 2016 it reduced by almost half, to 11.59%. The rest is
ﬁnanced by the State, whose budgetary name is "Source 10".
The increase over time in the PU budget is due not only to the increase in the
number of national universities in that period but also to an increase in the budget for
the four PUs already existing in 2003. These four original universities had a budget
of 0.55% of the GDP in 2003 and increased to 0.80% of GDP in 2016.
The budget of the PUs also shows an increase in their participation in the total
budget of the state. In 2003, the PU budget represented 4.48% of the total budget of
the state. In 2013, it reached as high as 6.28%, while it fell to 5.33% in 2016 (which
is still higher than in 2003).
Not all PU expenses can be attributed to tertiary education itself. The Paraguay-
Brazil Experimental College or CEPB (a primary and secondary school), for example,
is part of UNA. This school represents approximately 1% of the entire UNA budget.
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Figure 20: Average cost per student per college
Note: the College of Medical Sciences is excluded since it is not possible to distinguish
the costs of tertiary education from the costs of the Hospital de Clínicas (an important
and big hospital). The result of doing the same calculation for this faculty with all
expenses gives 185 million of guaranies (national currency of Paraguay) per student.
Source: 2016 Statistical Yearbook, National University of Asunción.
Much more important is the Hospital de Clínicas. This hospital is part of the budget
of the UNA in the College of Medical Sciences. Although it is a necessary aspect
of medical education because it is a hospital-school, only a part of the costs of this
hospital can be attributed to medical training. This point is important since in 2016
40% of everything spent by the UNA was in the College of Medical Sciences.
The costs per student of the diﬀerent faculties (departments) can be obtained for
the UNA thanks to the statistical yearbook of the UNA. In ﬁgure 5, the expenditures
of each faculty are divided by the number of students (of degree and postgraduate)
in each faculty.
As stated previously, the College of Medical Sciences' numbers include all the
operating costs of the Hospital de Clínicas, so they cannot be interpreted as a good
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approximation of the average cost of medical education.
Leaving aside the College of Medical Sciences, the rest of the faculties have an
annual cost of between Gs. 6.33 million up to Gs. 43.8 million. The School of Law
and Social Sciences and the College of Economic Sciences produce a professional at
the lowest cost. The College of Dentistry, the most expensive, invests an annual
average of Gs. 43.8 million per student.
These costs per student have been growing in real terms in recent years in the
UNA. The following graph shows the average costs per student in terms of minimum
wages (MW) for periods of ﬁve years, the average length of an undergraduate degree
program in Paraguay. The reason for presenting the cost in minimum wages is that in
Paraguay the minimum wages are adjusted once a year to preserve the value against
inﬂation.
The PUs went from having a budget that represents approximately 0.5% to 1%
of GDP in 13 years. This growth is due not only to a growth in the number of
universities and students but also to the increase in the average real cost per student.
3.4 Proposed policy change and analysis of amount of recovery
The high concentration of students in the highest deciles of the population and the
increase (in absolute terms and relative to GDP or the total state budget) of expen-
ditures in the PUs imply that this state expenditure is regressive and increasingly
important.
Therefore, below, I propose a change in the ﬁnancing of public universities that
allows the regression of this state expenditure to be eliminated without aﬀecting
other objectives that the PUs have. A proposal is then sought that does not aﬀect
the public nature of the PUs and their mission to be social mobilizers and creator of
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Figure 21: Average cost per student for the UNA for periods of ﬁve years
The entire budget of the UNA is counted, excluding the Faculty of Medical Sciences.
The bars are the result of dividing all these costs by the number of students of
the UNA (excluding the Faculty of Medical Sciences), dividing them by the current
minimum wage in each year, and adding them for the corresponding periods. It can
be interpreted that a student who started the undergraduate program in 2007 and
ﬁnished it in 2011 cost on average 27.21 MW. Source: 2016 Statistical Yearbook,
National University of Asunción.
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science, to give those with limited resources opportunities to earn a university degree,
to promote meritocracy, etc.
The proposal has two parts:
1. Eliminate all fees that students must pay to complete the degree Although this
represents only 11% or less of the entire PU budget, for low-income students it
can represent a barrier to start or continue their university studies.
2. Establish a tax on the additional income that the people who have studied in
a PU will pay in the future; these students will accumulate a debt (equal to
the cost of their studies) with the state. These debts will be updated with the
inﬂation rate every year and must be paid if the people achieve income above
a certain amount to be established. If the income exceeds this amount, an
additional income tax rate will be added to that established by the Personal
Income Tax (IRP, Impuesto a la Renta Personal in Spanish)
This proposal is similar to systems established in England, Australia, and Uruguay,
among other countries. Murphy, Scott-Clayton, and Wyness (2018) explain in detail
the eﬀects of the reform in England. In England, students don't pay while studying,
but they repay later in the future is their annual income is above 21,000 pounds.
This system reduces the PU main problem, which is regressivity, since the bene-
ﬁciaries of this expense pay for the cost of their education if their income is above a
certain amount.
This system does not eliminate social mobility (in fact, it improves it by eliminat-
ing tariﬀs) and it still continues to reward meritocracy. Although it may not be free,
you will never pay more than what was invested, and if you do not reach an income
high enough in the future, you will pay less than what was received.
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Figure 22: People 25 years old or older who attended the university
Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the EPH 2016
One of the main facts that motivate this proposal is that those who have attended
university tend to have high incomes in the future. The following graph shows what
deciles belong to those who have attended at least one year of university and today
are over 25 years old.
With this proposal, the collection generated by each student will be between Gs 0
and the entire investment in the student. For each individual, the expected collection
is equal to:
Ri = min
{
τ (Ij)
T∑
j=t0
(1− Pj)
∫
Ij (θj) d (θj) , Investment per student
}
Where the collection R_i is the sum of all future income I_j (which will depend
randomly on the shock \theta_j) discounted the mortality rate P_j, multiplied by
the tax rate \tau_j. As the collection cannot exceed what has been invested in the
54
Table 3: Parameters
Parameter Value
Investment per student 34.59 MW
t0 25
T 65
student, the ﬁnal collection will be the minimum between the two objects.
3.4.1 Collection estimate
To estimate the revenue generated by this ﬁnancing system, data from the 2016 EPH
will be used. In the survey, we can obtain the income of people who have completed
or partially attended university programs. Using this survey, one cannot distinguish
between public and private university attendance, so I will use the income of all those
with university degrees or who have attended, but not completed a university degree.
The income data will be sorted by the age of the person. For the estimation, it
will be assumed that this income is equal to the expected income of the person with
a university education.
From the population projections of the Directorate of Surveys, Statistics, and
Censuses, mortality by age will be calculated.
With the mortality and income data, 50,000 people who passed through a PU
will be simulated. Income will be treated as random shocks, where the probability of
obtaining income Ijwill be equal to the proportion of people with age j and income
equal to I observed in the EPH 2016.
The parameters used in the estimation are found in the following table:
The investment per student is calculated as the average expenditure per student
for the UNA, taking all the faculties into account with the exception of the Faculty
of Medical Sciences. That investment is equal to Gs. 60,680,000 for the ﬁve years
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Table 4: Tax rate bracket
Bracket (τI) Rate
0 - 3 MW 0%
3 - 4 MW 1%
4 - 5 MW 2%
5 - 6 MW 3%
6 - 7 MW 4%
7 - 8 MW 5%
8 - 9 MW 6%
10 - 11 MW 7%
11 or more 8%
Table 5: Recovery for other tax rates and costs
Cost per student in monthly MWs
34.59 40 45
Tax rates
1% less in each bracket 66.3% 61.6% 57.3%
Same bracket 74.1% 69.8% 66.4%
1% more in each bracket 79.78% 76.4% 73.1%
between 2012 and 2016. To discount the eﬀects of inﬂation, all values will be expressed
in the number of minimum wages (MW) of the year. This investment corresponds to
34.59 MW per student, for a period of ﬁve years.
The ages from 25 to 65 years will be used.
The tax rates for the ﬁscal year are established in the following table:
Results: the results of the simulation show that 52.94% of students would pay the
cost of their university study in its entirety. The rest is partially paid, putting the
total recovery of the investment at 74.1%.
We can do some robustness analysis by adjusting the investment per student and
the interest rates, shown in the table below:
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3.5 Conclusion
PUs in Paraguay attract mostly students who belong to households in the highest
income deciles. The reasons why this happens are beyond the scope of this paper.
One of them can be seen in the EPH since the family income itself is important for
explaining the diﬀerence in dropout rates of primary and secondary education. Only
10% of 18- and 19-year-olds of the lowest decile have ﬁnished secondary education,
compared with 71% of the highest decile.
The cost of PUs is not negligible. It represents approximately 1% of GDP or just
over 5% of all state spending and this number is steadily increasing.
We propose a tax that corrects the problem of the regressivity of this expense,
without aﬀecting the main objectives of the PU. This tax, similar to that implemented
in other countries, is easy to apply. Because of its design, it only aﬀects those who
earn enough to pay it.
Our simulation shows that with maximum rates of 8%, the system can generate
a recovery of at least 75% of everything invested per student.
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Appendix A. Appendix to chapter 1
Proof of proposition.
Given the distribution for w and θ the distribution of the uniﬁed-type n is given
by:
f (n) =

αwα0
nα+1
1
θH−θL
[
(n/w0)
α+2−θα+2L
α+2
]
if n/w0 < θH
αwα0
nα+1
1
θH−θL
[
θα+2H −θα+2L
α+2
]
if n/w0 ≥ θH
The modiﬁed welfare weight bˆ (n) =
(∫∞
0
b(n/θ)hˆ(θ,n)dθ
f(n)
)
is then:
bˆ (n) =

κ(α+2)
nη(η+1)
[
θη+1H −θη+1L
(n/w0)
α+2−θα+2L
]
if n/w0 < θH
κ(α+2)
nη(η+1)
[
θη+1H −θη+1L
θα+2H −θα+2L
]
if n/w0 ≥ θH
Then bˆ (n) f (n) = καw
α
0
nα+η+1(η+1)
[
θη+1H − θη+1L
]
.
From (8)we have:
G (n) =
∫ n
0
bˆ (m) f (m) dm∫∞
0
bˆ (m) f (m) dm
=
∫ n
0
καwα0
mα+η+1(η+1)
[
θη+1H − θη+1L
]
dm∫∞
0
καwα0
mα+η+1(η+1)
[
θη+1H − θη+1L
]
dm
=
καwα0
(η+1)
[
θη+1H − θη+1L
] ∫ n
w0θL
1
mα+η+1
dm
καwα0
(η+1)
[
θη+1H − θη+1L
] ∫ +∞
w0θL
1
mα+η+1
dm
=
∫ n
w0θL
1
mα+η+1
dm∫ +∞
w0θL
1
mα+η+1
dm
=
1
w0θL
− 1
nα+η
1
w0θL
=
nα+η − w0θL
nα+η
From (3) we have that:
T ′ (y (n))
1− T ′ (y (n)) =
1 + 1/γ
nf (n)
(G (n)− F (n))
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=
1 + 1/γ
n
αwα0
nα+1
1
θH−θL
[
θα+2H −θα+2L
α+2
] (nα+η − w0θL
nα+η
−
(
1− θ
α+2
H − θα+2L
(α + 2) (θH − θL)
(wo
n
)α))
=
(1 + 1/γ) (θH − θL) (α + 2)
α
[
θα+2H − θα+2L
] ( n
w0
)α(
nα+η − w0θL
nα+η
− 1 + θ
α+2
H − θα+2L
(α + 2) (θH − θL)
(wo
n
)α)
=
(1 + 1/γ) (θH − θL) (α + 2)nα
αwα0
[
θα+2H − θα+2L
] (nα+η − w0θL
nα+η
− 1
)
+
(1 + 1/γ)
α
The ﬁrst term of the equation goes to zero as  → 1, since the parentheses term
goes to zero (while the term not in parenthesis goes to a constant).
So:
T ′ (y (n))
1− T ′ (y (n)) →
(1 + 1/γ)
α
, ∀n ≥ w0θH
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Appendix B. Appendix to chapter 2
To calibrate the model, we use standard methods of Growth Accounting. Parameters
δ and K0, the depreciation rate and the initial capital are calculated together, so
that two conditions are satisﬁed. We use 1964 as the ﬁrst data of capital, so any
miscalculation of the initial capital is reduced by depreciation over time. First, the
initial capital output ratio of the data is equal to the average of the capital output
ratio for the ﬁrst ten years,
K1964
Y1964
=
1
10
1974∑
1964
Kt
Yt
.
Second, the depreciation rate times the average of the capital-output ratio of the
model is equal to the average of the ratio of depreciation over GDP in the data.
1
44
2007∑
1964
δKt
Yt
=
1
44
depreciation
Yt
θ is calculated as the sample average over 1990 to 2007 of the compensation of
capital. αa is calculated for every age with the formula:
αa =
T − ha
T − hbα
b,
such that the hours decided by each cohort matches the sample average of the data.
β is calculated using the intertemporal equation 16. T is the total discretionary hours
in a week.
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Appendix C. Appendix to chapter 3
The National University of Asunción, through its "Socioeconomic Report of En-
trants," presents numbers that contradict those presented by the EPH. For example,
it says that in 2016 more than 97% of entrants were from "Low," "Medium Low,"
or "Medium" income and the remaining less than 3% were from "Medium-high" or
"High" income. The UNA Socioeconomic Report of Entrants presents enormous
problems to determine the actual social stratum of the members. Before going to the
methodological and incentive reasons why the report should be considered inaccurate,
I will ﬁrst mention a very telling inaccuracy. The following table shows the number
of "High" income students that were enrolled in 2010 (especially the students, not
just incoming students) and then the number of "High" income students who were
enrolled from 2011 to 2016.
Table 6: Students of High income level at the UNA
Surveyed Year Number of respondents High income people Percentage
All the students 2010 25,227 3 0.01%
Incoming students 2011 5,474 2 0.04%
Incoming students 2012 5,379 0 0.00%
Incoming students 2013 5,085 5 0.10%
Incoming students 2014 6,011 1 0.02%
Incoming students 2015 5,441 1 0.02%
Incoming students 2016 4,870 1 0.02%
There were three students of "High" income in the UNA in 2010 and then they
enrolled only ten more from 2011 to 2016. In the last decade, a total of 13 high-
income students went through the entire UNA. Only the Faculties of Law, Philosophy,
Agronomy, Exact Sciences, and Economics ever saw "High" students, the rest of the
faculties none. This data is very striking. Below are some of the reasons why so few
students enter the "High" income classiﬁcation based on the 2016 report: 1. The
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methodology does not really measure social stratum. One may imagine that if ﬁve
categories are in use, category 1 should represent the poorest 20% of the country, 2
should be the next 20-40%, and so on. However, this is not the case here. Rather, it
is based on a system of points where family income only represents 15% (15 points
out of 100). That the student works, for example, is worth 12 (16 maximum, 4
minimum) points, the academic level and the occupation of the parents are worth 34
points. Then, to be of "medium-high" income, you must have at least 71 points, and
for "high" income, 87 points. It could well be that, if we measure the whole country,
only 1% enter into what this report deﬁnes as high income. Some characteristics of
this report: a. If the entrant does not work, he automatically loses 12 points. For
only that reason he can no longer be considered high income, regardless of family
income or any wealth that he may have. But does this really measure if one is high or
low income? It is likely that those with high incomes are the ones who decide not to
work since they must dedicate time to income. In addition, there are programs that,
for the time they demand, make it impossible to work. What is found is quite the
opposite: in this case not working is probably an indicator of having a high income
and not a low one. The same report shows that 70% of all students do not work. b.
If both parents have "only" college degrees, two points are lost. They have to have at
least Masters degrees or Ph.D.s to earn all the points in this category. c. If there are
ﬁve or more people living in one household, points are lost. Income is not taken into
consideration. d. If only one parent works, 6 points are lost. e. If one does not own
a car, 5 points are lost. f. Having landline telephones is worth 1 point. But one must
own two telephones to earn the whole point. Having only one telephone costs half
a point. g. All this makes it very diﬃcult to be categorized as "high" or "medium-
high" income. By way of illustration, let us consider a non-working student whose
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father has gone to college, who has 3 siblings, a mother who does not work, only one
telephone, and the father earns the equivalent of 30 monthly minimum wages. This
report would classify the student as middle income, while the EPH shows that this
family belongs to the highest decile and is among the richest families in the country.
2. This report engages in what is known as "adverse selection". This survey is
not only used for statistical purposes, but it is also used to apply for scholarships.
Therefore, those who really have low incomes will be sure to complete the survey,
while those who really have high income may do so, but may not. Only 64% of
university entrants answered this survey.
3. There is also a "hidden Information" problem. If pretending to be a family
income situation is more precarious than in reality increases the probability of ob-
taining a scholarship, many will do so. In other words, there is a strong incentive for
people to lie on this survey in order to be eligible for a scholarship.
There are potentially many other problems such as, for example, that students
do not know the exact income of parents and others. But I think these points are
enough to explain the diﬀerence with the EPH.
